

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 153523

17

ORIGIN EA-04

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /005 R

66618

DRAFTED BY EA/RA:RNETHERCUT:CHG

APPROVED BY EA/RA:RNETHERCUT

EA/VN: MR WENZELL PHOENE

----- 008980

R 162037Z JUL 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 153523

FOLLOWING REPEAT SAIGON 8958 SENT ACTION SETOCKHOLM INFO SECSTATE
COPENHAGEN HELSINKI LONDON OSLO REYKJAVIK
M JUL 8TH.

QUOTE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 8958

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, VN, VS, SW

SUBJ: PALME'S REPORTED VIEWS ON VIET-NAM

REF: STOCKHOLM 2793

INTRODUCTION: THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE OFFERED IN REFUTATION
OF PALME'S VIEWS ON VIETANAM AS REPORTED REFTEL. WHILE WE HAVE
NO ILLUSION THAT OUR ARGUMENTS WILL SWAY INVETERATE "VIET-
CONGOPHILES" LIKE PALME, WE FEEL COMPELLED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO
SET THE RECORD STRIAGHT. END INTRODUCTION.

1. PALME'S REPORTED BELIEF THAT AID TO THE GVN DOWS NOT REACH
THOSE IN NEED WHEREAS THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE IN THE NORTH IS
GROSSLY INACCURATE. THE FACT THAT FOREIGN AID REACHES THOSE IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 153523

THE RVN FOR WHOM IT IS INTENDED IS SOMETHING WHICH CAN BE

AND IS PHYSICALLY OBSERVED AND VERIFIED. THE OCCASIONAL IRREGULARITY WHICH MAY OCCUR IS A RARE EXCEPTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE HANOI REGIME'S UTTER MISMANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN AID FORCED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FRIENDS LAST YEAR TO DEMAND AN INVENTORY OF CAPITAL GOODS AS A PRECONDITION TO FUTURE AID PROGRAMS.

2. IN ADDITION, UNLIKE IN THE SOUTH WHERE AID DELIVERIES AND UTILIZATION ARE CLOSELY MONITORED BY DONOR COUNTRIES, THE DRV AUTHORITIES OFTEN DO NOT ALLOW EVEN THEIR COMMUNIST BRETHREN TO INSPECT PROJECTS TO VERIFY THAT AID GOODS ARE BEING USED PROPERLY. IN THIS REGARD, HANOI ITSELF HAS ADMITTED THAT COMMODITIES, FROM FOODSTUFFS TO BUILDING MATERIALS, AND EQUIPMENT, FROM SIMPLE TOOLS TO VEHICLES, HAVE BEEN STOLEN BY PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOR SALE ON THE FREE MARKET OR HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THESE OFFICIALS FOR THEIR OWN PRIVATE USE OR GAIN.

3. THERE CAN BE NO QUARREL WITH PALME'S ASSERTION THAT HANOI WOULD PROVIDE A "STRONG " GOVERNMENT OVER A UNITED VIET-NAM. UNDER HANOI'S REIN, SOUTHERNERS WOULD EXPERIENCE THE SAME EMPTY POLITICS, THE SAME ABJECT POVERTY AND THE SAME INTELLECTUAL STERILITY WHICH HAVE BEEN PROMINENT FEATURES OF LIFE IN THE NORTH FOR THE PAST 20 YEARS. MOREOVER, A FEW HUNDRED THOUSAND SOUTHERNERS WOULD OBTAIN WHAT ONLY A "STRONG" GOVERNMENT CAN METE OUT: AN IGNOMINIOUS DEATH AT THE HANDS OF PARTY-ORGANIZED MOBS LIKE THOSE WHICH PROWLED THE NORTH DURING THE 1945-47 "CONSOLIDATION" PHASE AND THE 1954-56 LAND REFORM CAMPAIGN. INDEED, IF A GOVERNMENT STRENGTH CAN BE JUDGED BY THE SCALE OF TERROR AND DEPRIVATION TO WHICH IT IS WILLING AND ABLE TO SUBJECT ITS PEOPLE, THEN THE DRV HAS, WITHOUT DOUBT, THE STRONGEST REGIME IN THE REGION.

4. PALME'S ARGUMENT THAT A UNITED, COMMUNIST VIET-NAM WOULD BE A STABILIZING FACTOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATES HANOI'S POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. ONE NEED ONLY QUERY THAIS, CAMBODIANS OR LAO TO APPRECIATE HOW MUCH STABILITY THEY BELIEVE WOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY HANOI'S DOMINATION OF ALL OF VIET-NAM. ULTIMATELY, THE REGION WOULD BE STABLE, OF COURSE; BUT ONLY AFTER THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAD INSTALLED CLIENT REGIMES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND THAILAND HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZED.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 153523

5. THE SUGGESTION THAT HANOI'S INDEPENDENCE OF MOSCOW AND PEKING WOULD MAKE IT A "STABILIZING FACTOR" IS JUST SHORT OF LUDICROUS. THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE--IN FACT, EVERY REASON TO DOUBT-- THAT, ONCE IN CONTROL OF ALL VIET-NAM, HANOI WOULD ABANDON OR LIMIT ITS SUBVERSIVE AND OUTRIGHT AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS IN THE REGION. INDEED, IF ITS CAMPAIGN TO ANNEX THE SOUTH IS SUCCESSFUL, HANOI WILL BE ABLE TO FOCUS ITS ENERGIES OUTWARD TO THREATEN EVEN MORE

DIRECTLY THE SECURITY OF ITS NEIGHBORS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IT IS
IN NO SMALL PART THE APPROBATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH OTHERWISE
RESPECTABLE STATES AS SWEDEN WHICH MAKES HANOI'S BELLIGERENT
ATTITUDE AND UNCOMPROMISING POSITION TENABLE BEFORE WORLD
PUBLIC OPINION.
MARTIN
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, COMMUNISTS, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: kelleyw0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE153523
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RNETHERCUT:CHG
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740191-0504
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740744/aaaablpd.tel
Line Count: 122
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STOCKHOLM 2793
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: kelleyw0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAY 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <25-Sep-2002 by kelleyw0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PALME'S REPORTED VIEWS ON VIET-NAM
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, VN, VS, SW, US, (PALME)
To: BANGKOK VIENTIANE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005